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Abstract
The goal of network representation learning is to
learn low-dimensional node embeddings that cap-
ture the graph structure and are useful for solving
downstream tasks. However, despite the prolifera-
tion of such methods, there is currently no study
of their robustness to adversarial attacks. We pro-
vide the first adversarial vulnerability analysis
on the widely used family of methods based on
random walks. We derive efficient adversarial per-
turbations that poison the network structure and
have a negative effect on both the quality of the
embeddings and the downstream tasks. We fur-
ther show that our attacks are transferable since
they generalize to many models and are successful
even when the attacker is restricted.
1. Introduction
Unsupervised node embedding (network representation
learning) approaches are becoming increasingly popular
and achieve state-of-the-art performance on many network
learning tasks (Cai et al., 2018). The goal is to embed
each node in a low-dimensional feature space such that
the graph’s structure is captured. The learned embeddings
are subsequently used for downstream tasks such as link
prediction, node classification, community detection, and
visualization. Among the variety of proposed approaches,
techniques based on random walks (RWs) (Perozzi et al.,
2014; Grover & Leskovec, 2016) are often employed since
they incorporate higher-order relational information. Given
the increasing popularity of these methods there is a strong
need for an analysis of their robustness. In particular, we
aim to study the existence and effects of adversarial pertur-
bations. A large body of research shows that both traditional
and deep learning methods can easily be fooled/attacked:
even slight deliberate data perturbations can lead to wrong
results (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Mei & Zhu, 2015; Carlini
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& Wagner, 2017; Liang et al., 2018; Cisse´ et al., 2017; Lin
et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017a).
While adversarial attacks for graph models have been pro-
posed recently (Zu¨gner et al., 2018; Dai et al., 2018a; Zu¨gner
& Gu¨nnemann, 2019), they are all limited to the semi-
supervised learning setting. In contrast, this is the first
work that studies adversarial perturbations for unsupervised
embeddings. This is critical, since especially in domains
where graph embeddings are used (e.g. the web) adversaries
are common and false data is easy to inject: e.g. spammers
can easily create fake followers on social networks. Can
we construct attacks that do no rely on a specific down-
stream task? Are node embedding methods just as easily
fooled, since compared to semi-supervised models they do
not incorporate a supervision signal that can be exploited?
Barring the few above-mentioned attacks on graphs most
existing works on adversarial attacks perturb the features
of individual instances. In our case however, since we are
operating on plain graph data (no features are available) we
perturb the interactions (edges) between instances instead.
Manipulating the network structure (the graph) is a common
scenario with link spam farms (Gyo¨ngyi & Garcia-Molina,
2005) and Sybil attacks (Yu et al., 2006) as typical examples.
Moreover, since node embeddings are typically trained in
an unsupervised and transductive fashion we cannot rely
on a single end-task that our attack might exploit to find
appropriate perturbations, and we have to handle a chal-
lenging poisoning attack where the model is learned after
the attack. That is, the model cannot be assumed to be
static as in most existing attacks. Lastly, since graphs are
discrete, gradient-based approaches (Li et al., 2016; Mei &
Zhu, 2015) for finding adversarial perturbations that were
designed for continuous data are not well suited. In par-
ticular, for methods based on random walks the gradient
computation is not directly possible since sampling random
walks is not a differentiable operation. The question is how
to design efficient algorithms that are able to find adver-
sarial perturbations in such a challenging – discrete and
combinatorial – graph domain?
We propose a principled strategy for adversarial attacks on
unsupervised node embeddings. Exploiting results from
eigenvalue perturbation theory (Stewart, 1990) we are able
to efficiently solve a challenging bi-level optimization prob-
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lem associated with the poisoning attack. We assume
an attacker with full knowledge about the data and the
model, thus ensuring reliable vulnerability analysis in the
worst case. Nonetheless, our experiments on transferability
demonstrate that our strategy generalizes – attacks learned
based on one model successfully fool other models as well.
Additionally, we study the effect of restricting the attacker.
Overall, we shed light on an important problem that has
not been studied so far. We show that node embeddings are
sensitive to adversarial attacks. Relatively few changes are
needed to significantly damage the quality of the embed-
dings even in the scenario where the attacker is restricted.
Furthermore, our paper highlights that more work is needed
to make node embeddings robust to adversarial perturba-
tions and thus readily applicable in production systems.
2. Related Work
We focus on unsupervised node embedding approaches
based on random walks (RWs) and further show how one
can easily apply a similar analysis to attack spectral-based
node embeddings. For a recent survey, also of other non-RW
based approaches, we refer to Cai et al. (2018). Moreover,
while many semi-supervised learning methods (Defferrard
et al., 2016; Kipf & Welling, 2017; Klicpera et al., 2019)
have been introduced, we focus on unsupervised methods
since they are often used in practice due to their flexibility
in simultaneously solving various downstream tasks.
Adversarial attacks. Attacking machine learning models
has a long history, with seminal works on SVMs and logistic
regression (Biggio et al., 2012; Mei & Zhu, 2015). Neural
networks were also shown to be highly sensitive to small
adversarial perturbations to the input (Szegedy et al., 2014;
Goodfellow et al., 2015). While most works focus on image
classification, recent works also study adversarial examples
in other domains (Grosse et al., 2017; Liang et al., 2018).
Different taxonomies exist characterizing the adversaries
based on their goals, knowledge, and capabilities (Papernot
et al., 2016; Biggio et al., 2017; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al.,
2017). The two dominant attacks types are poisoning attacks
targeting the training data (the model is trained after the
attack) and evasion attacks targeting the test data/application
phase (the learned model is assumed fixed). Compared to
evasion attacks, poisoning attacks are far less studied (Mei
& Zhu, 2015; Li et al., 2016; Koh & Liang, 2017; Mun˜oz-
Gonza´lez et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017a) since they usually
require solving a challenging bi-level optimization problem.
Attacks on semi-supervised graph models. The robust-
ness of semi-supervised graph classification methods to ad-
versarial attacks has recently been analyzed (Zu¨gner et al.,
2018; Dai et al., 2018a; Zu¨gner & Gu¨nnemann, 2019). The
first work, introduced by Zu¨gner et al. (2018), linearizes a
graph convolutional network (GCN) (Kipf & Welling, 2017)
to derive a closed-form expression for the change in class
probabilities for a given edge/feature perturbation. They
calculate a score for each possible edge flip based on the
classification margin and greedily pick the top edge flips
with highest scores. Later, Dai et al. (2018a) proposed
a reinforcement (Q-)learning formulation where they de-
compose the selection of relevant edge flips into selecting
the two end-points. Zu¨gner & Gu¨nnemann (2019) develop
a general attack on the training procedure of GCN using
meta-gradients. All three approaches focus on the semi-
supervised graph classification task and take advantage of
the supervision signal to construct the attacks. In contrast,
our work focuses on general attacks on unsupervised node
embeddings applicable to many downstream tasks.
Manipulating graphs. There is an extensive literature on
optimizing the graph structure to manipulate: information
spread in a network (Khalil et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2016),
user opinions (Chaoji et al., 2012; Amelkin & Singh, 2017),
shortest paths (Phillips, 1993; Israeli & Wood, 2002), page
rank scores (Csa´ji et al., 2014), and other metrics (Chan
et al., 2014). In the context of graph clustering, Chen et al.
(2017b) measure the performance changes when injecting
noise to a bi-partite graph of DNS queries, but do not focus
on automatically generating attacks. Zhao et al. (2018)
study poisoning attacks on multi-task relationship learning,
although they exploit relations between tasks, they still deal
with the classic scenario of i.i.d. instances within each task.
Robustness and adversarial training. Robustification of
machine learning models, including graph based models
(Bojchevski et al., 2017; Zu¨gner & Gu¨nnemann, 2019), has
been studied and is known as adversarial/robust machine
learning. These approaches are out of the scope for this pa-
per. Adversarial training, e.g. via GANs (Dai et al., 2018b),
is similarly beyond our scope since the goal is to improve the
embeddings, while our goal is to asses the vulnerability of
existing embedding methods to adversarial perturbations.
3. Attacking Node Embeddings
We study poisoning attacks on the graph structure – the
attacker is capable of adding or removing (flipping) edges in
the original graph within a given budget. We focus mainly
on approaches based on random walks and extend the anal-
ysis to spectral approaches (Sec. 6.2 in the appendix).
3.1. Background and Preliminaries
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected unweighted graph where
V is the set of nodes, E is the set of edges, and A ∈
{0, 1}|V |×|V | is the adjacency matrix. The goal of network
representation learning is to find a low-dimensional embed-
ding zv ∈ RK for each node with K  |V |. This dense
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low-dimensional representation should preserve information
about the network structure – nodes similar in the original
network should be close in the embedding space. DeepWalk
(Perozzi et al., 2014) and node2vec (Grover & Leskovec,
2016) learn an embedding based on RWs by adapting the
skip-gram architecture (Mikolov et al., 2013) for learning
word embeddings. They sample finite (biased) RWs and use
the co-occurrence of node-context pairs in a given window
in each RW as a measure of similarity. To learn zv they
maximize the probability of observing v’s neighborhood.
3.2. Attack Model
We denote with Aˆ the adjacency matrix of the graph ob-
tained after the attacker has modified certain entries in A.
We assume the attacker has a given, fixed budget and is only
capable of modifying f entries, i.e. ||Aˆ−A||0 = 2f (times
2 since G is undirected). The goal of the attacker is to dam-
age the quality of the learned embeddings, which in turn
harms subsequent learning tasks such as node classification
or link prediction that use the embeddings. We consider
both a general attack that aims to degrade the embeddings
of the network as a whole, and a targeted attack that aims to
damage the embeddings regarding a specific target / task.
The quality of the embeddings is measured by the loss
L(A,Z) of the model under attack, with lower loss corre-
sponding to higher quality, where Z ∈ RN×K is the matrix
containing the embeddings of all nodes. Thus, the goal of
the attacker is to maximize the loss. We can formalize this
as the following bi-level optimization problem:
Aˆ∗ = arg max
Aˆ∈{0,1}N×N
L(Aˆ, Z∗) Z∗ = min
Z
L(Aˆ, Z)
subj. to ||Aˆ−A||0 = 2f , Aˆ = AˆT
Here, Z∗ is always the ’optimal’ embedding resulting from
the (to be optimized) graph Aˆ, i.e. it minimizes the loss,
while the attacker tries to maximize the loss. Solving such a
problem is challenging given its discrete and combinatorial
nature, thus we derive efficient approximations.
3.3. General Attack
The first step in RW-based embedding approaches is to sam-
ple a set of random walks that serve as a training corpus
further complicating the bi-level optimization problem. We
have Z∗ = minZ L({r1, r2, . . . }, Z) with ri ∼ RW (Aˆ),
where RW is an intermediate stochastic procedure that gen-
erates RWs given the graph Aˆ which we are optimizing.
By flipping (even a few) edges in the graph, the attacker
necessarily changes the set of possible RWs, thus changing
the training corpus. Therefore, this sampling procedure pre-
cludes any gradient-based methods. To tackle this challenge
we leverage recent results that show that (given certain as-
sumptions) RW-based embedding approaches are implicitly
factorizing the Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI) matrix
(Yang & Liu, 2015; Qiu et al., 2018). We study DeepWalk
as an RW-based representative approach since it’s one of
the most popular methods and has many extensions. Specif-
ically, we use the results from Qiu et al. (2018) to sidestep
the stochasticity induced by sampling random walks.
Lemma 1 (Qiu et al. (2018)). DeepWalk is equivalent to
factorizing Mˆ = log(max(M, 1)) with
M = vol(A)T ·b S, S =
( T∑
r=1
P r
)
D−1, P = D−1A (1)
where the embedding Z∗ is obtained by the Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD) of Mˆ = UΣV T using the top-K
largest singular values / vectors, i.e. Z∗ = UKΣ
1/2
K .
Here, D is the diagonal degree matrix with Dii =
∑
j Aij ,
T is the window size, b is the number of negative sam-
ples and vol(A) =
∑
i,j Aij is the volume. Since M is
sparse and has many zero entries the matrix log(M) where
the log is elementwise is ill-defined and dense. To cope
with this, similar to the Shifted Positive PMI (PPMI), ap-
proach the elementwise maximum is introduced to form Mˆ .
Using this insight we see that DeepWalk is equivalent to
optimizing minMˆK ||Mˆ − MˆK ||2F where MˆK is the best
rank-K approximation to Mˆ . This in turn means that the
loss for DeepWalk when using the optimal embedding Z∗
for a given graph A is LDW1(A,Z∗) =
[∑|V |
p=K+1 σ
2
p
]1/2
where σp are the singular values of Mˆ(A) sorted decreas-
ingly σ1 ≥ σ2 · · · ≥ σ|V |. This result shows that we do not
need to construct random walks, nor do we have to (explic-
itly) learn the embedding Z∗ – it is implicitly considered via
the singular values of Mˆ(A). Accordingly, we have trans-
formed the bi-level problem into a single-level optimization
problem. However, maximizing LDW1 is still challenging
due to the SVD and the discrete nature of the problem.
Gradient based approach. Maximizing LDW1 with a
gradient-based approach is not straightforward since we
cannot easily backpropagate through the SVD. To tackle
this challenge we exploit ideas from eigenvalue perturbation
theory (Stewart, 1990) to efficiently approximate LDW1(A)
in closed-form without needing to recompute the SVD.
Theorem 1. Let A be the initial adjacency matrix and
Mˆ(A) be the respective co-occurrence matrix. Let up be
the p-th eigenvector corresponding to the p-th largest eigen-
value of Mˆ . Given a perturbed matrix A′, with A′ =
A + ∆A, and the respective change ∆Mˆ , LDW1(A′) ≈[∑N
p=K+1
(
uTp (Mˆ + ∆Mˆ)up
)2]1/2
=: LDW2(A′) is an
approximation of the loss and the error is bounded by
|LDW1(A′)− LDW2(A′)| ≤ ||∆Mˆ ||F .
The proof is given in the appendix. For a small ∆A and
thus small ∆Mˆ we obtain a very good approximation, and
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if ∆A = ∆Mˆ = 0 then the loss is exact. Intuitively, we
can think of using eigenvalue perturbation as analogous to
taking the gradient of the loss w.r.t. Mˆ(A). Now, gradient-
based optimization is efficient since ∇ALDW2(A) avoids
recomputing the eigenvalue decomposition. The gradient
provides useful information for a small  change, however,
here we are considering discrete flips, i.e.  = ±1 so its
usefulness is limited. Furthermore, using gradient-based
optimization requires a dense instantiation of the adjacency
matrix which has complexity O(|V |2) in both runtime and
memory, infeasible for large graphs. This motivates the
need for our more advanced approach.
Sparse closed-form approach. Our goal is to efficiently
compute the change in the loss LDW1(A) given a set of
flipped edges. To do so we will analyze the change in the
spectrum of some of the intermediate matrices and then
derive a bound on the change in the spectrum of the co-
occurrence matrix, which in turn will give an estimate of
the loss. First, we need some results.
Lemma 2. The matrix S in Eq. 1 is equal to S =
U(
∑T
r=1 Λ
r)UT where the matrices U and Λ contain the
eigenvectors and eigenvalues solving the generalized eigen-
problem Au = λDu.
The proof is given in the appendix. We see that the spectrum
of S (and the spectrum of M by taking the scalars into ac-
count) is obtainable from the generalized spectrum of A. In
contrast to Lemma 2, Qiu et al. (2018) factorize S using the
(non-generalized) spectrum of Anorm := D−1/2AD−1/2.
As we will show, our formulation using the generalized
spectrum of A is key for an efficient approximation.
Let A′ = A+∆A be the adjacency matrix after the attacker
performed some edge flips. As above, by computing the
generalized spectrum of A′, we can estimate the spectrum
of the resulting S′ and M ′. However, recomputing the
eigenvalues λ′ of A′ for every possible set of edge flips is
still not efficient for large graphs, preventing an effective
application of the method. Thus, we derive our first main
result: an efficient approximation bounding the change in
the singular values of M ′ for any edge flip.
Theorem 2. Let ∆A be a matrix with only 2 non-zero el-
ements, namely ∆Aij = ∆Aji = 1 − 2Aij correspond-
ing to a single edge flip (i, j), and ∆D the respective
change in the degree matrix, i.e. A′ = A + ∆A and
D′ = D + ∆D. Let uy be the y-th generalized eigenvector
of A with generalized eigenvalue λy. Then the generalized
eigenvalue λ′y of A
′ solving A′u′y = λ
′
yD
′u′y is approxi-
mately λ′y ≈ λy + ∆λy := λ˜′y with:
∆λy = ∆wij(2uyi · uyj − λy(u2yi + u2yj)) (2)
where uyi is the i-th entry of the vector uy, and ∆wij =
(1− 2Aij) indicates the edge flip, i.e ±1.
The proof is given in the appendix. By working with the gen-
eralized eigenvalue problem in Theorem 2 we were able to
expressA′ andD′ after flipping an edge as additive changes
to A and D, this in turn enabled us to leverage results from
eigenvalue perturbation theory to efficiently approximate
the change in the spectrum. If we used Anorm instead, the
change to A′norm would be multiplicative hindering effi-
cient approximation. Using Eq. 2, instead of recomputing
λ′ we only need to compute ∆λ to obtain the approximation
λ˜′ significantly reducing the complexity when evaluating
different edge flips (i, j). Using this result, we can now
efficiently bound the change in the singular values of S′.
Lemma 3. Let A′ be defined as before and S′ be the re-
sulting matrix. The singular values of S′ are bounded:
σp(S
′) ≤ σ˜p := 1d′min ·
∣∣∑T
r=1(λ˜
′
pi(p))
r
∣∣ where pi is a
permutation simply ensuring that the final σ˜p are sorted
decreasingly, and d′min is the smallest degree in A
′.
We provide the proof in the appendix. Now we can effi-
ciently compute the loss for a rank-K factorization of M ′,
which we would obtain when performing the edge flip (i, j),
i.e. LDW3(A′) = vol(A)+2∆wijT ·b
[∑|V |
p=K+1 σ˜
2
p
]1/2
, where
σ˜p is obtained by applying Lemma 3 and Theorem 2 and
the leading constants follow from Lemma 1.
While the original loss LDW1 is based on the matrix Mˆ =
log(max(M, 1)), there are unfortunately currently no tools
available to analyze the (change in the) spectrum of Mˆ given
the spectrum of M . Therefore, we use LDW3 as a surro-
gate loss for LDW1 (Yang et al. (2015) similarly exclude
the element-wise logarithm). As our experiments show, the
surrogate loss is effective and we can successfully attack
the node embeddings that factorize the actual co-occurrence
matrix Mˆ , as well as the original skip-gram model. Sim-
ilarly, spectral embedding methods (von Luxburg, 2007),
factorize the graph Laplacian and have a strong connection
to the RW based approaches. We provide an analysis of
their adversarial vulnerability in the appendix (Sec. 6.2).
The overall algorithm. Our goal is to maximize LDW3
by performing f edge flips. While Eq. 2 enables us to
efficiently compute the loss for a single edge, there are
still O(|V |2) possible flips. To reduce the complexity
when adding edges we instead form a candidate set by
randomly sampling C candidate pairs (non-edges). This
introduces a further approximation that nonetheless works
well in practice. Since real graphs are usually sparse, for
removing, all edges are viable candidates with one random
edge set aside for each node to ensure we do not have sin-
gleton nodes. For every candidate we compute its impact
on the loss via LDW3 and greedily choose the top f flips.1
1Periodically recomputing the exact eigenvalues when using
the greedy approach did not show any benefits. Code and data
available at https://www.kdd.in.tum.de/node embedding attack.
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The runtime complexity of our overall approach is then:
O(|V |·|E|+C ·|V | log |V |). First, we can compute the gen-
eralized eigenvectors ofA in a sparse fashion inO(|V |·|E|).
Then we sample C candidate edges, and for each we can
compute the approximate eigenvalues in constant time (The-
orem 2). To obtain the final loss, we sort the values leading
to the overall complexity. For the examined datasets the
wall-clock time for our approach is negligible: on the order
of few seconds when calculating the change in eigenvalues.
Furthermore, our approach is trivially parallelizable since
every candidate edge flip can be evaluated in parallel.
3.4. Targeted Attack
If the goal of the attacker is to attack a specific target node
t ∈ V , or a specific downstream task, it is suboptimal to
maximize the overall loss via LDW∗ . Rather, we should
define some other target specific loss that depends on t’s
embedding – replacing the loss function of the outer opti-
mization by another one operating on t’s embedding. Thus,
for any edge flip (i, j) we now need the change in t’s em-
bedding – meaning changes in the eigenvectors – which is
inherently more difficult to compute compared to changes in
eigen/singular-values. We study two cases: misclassifying a
target node (i.e. node classification tasks) and manipulating
the similarity of node pairs (i.e. link prediction task).
Surrogate embeddings. We define surrogate embeddings
such that we can efficiently estimate the change for a given
edge flip. Specifically, instead of performing an SVD of M
(or equivalently S scaled) we define Z¯∗ = U(
∑T
r=1 Λ
r), as
in Lemma 2. Experimentally, using Z¯∗ instead of Z∗ as the
embedding showed no significant change in the performance
on downstream tasks. While we use these surrogate embed-
dings to select the adversarial edges, during evaluation we
use the standard embeddings produced by DeepWalk. Now,
by approximating the generalized eigenvectors of A′, we
can also approximate Z¯∗(A′) in closed-form:
Theorem 3. Let ∆A,∆D and ∆wij be defined as before,
and ∆λy be the change in the y-th generalized eigenvalue
λy as derived in Theorem 2. Then, the y-th generalized
eigenvector u′y of A
′ after performing the edge flip (i, j)
can be approximated with:
u′y ≈ uy −∆wij(A− λyD)+
(−∆λyuy ◦ d (3)
+Ei(uyj − λyuyi) + Ej(uyi − λyuyj)
)
where Ei(x) returns a vector of zeros except at position i
where the value is x, d is a vector of the node degrees, ◦ is
the Hadamard product, and (·)+ is the pseudo-inverse.
We provide the proof in the appendix. Computing Eq. 3
seems expensive at first due to the pseudo-inverse term.
However, note that this term does not depend on the particu-
lar edge flip we perform. Thus, we can pre-compute it once
and furthermore, parallelize the computation for each y.
The additional complexity of computing the pseudo-inverse
for all y is O(K · |V |2.373). Similarly, we can pre-compute
uy ◦d, while the rest of the terms are all computable inO(1).
Overall, the wall-clock time for computing the change in the
eigenvectors is on the order of few minutes. For any edge
flip we can now efficiently compute the optimal embedding
Z¯∗(A′) using Eqs. 2 and 3. The t-th row of Z¯∗(A′) is the
desired embedding for a target node t after the attack.
Targeting node classification. Our goal is to missclassify
a target node t given a downstream node classification task.
To specify the targeted attack we need to define the candi-
date flips and the target-specific loss responsible for scoring
the candidates. We let the candidate set contain all edges
(and non-edges) directly incident to the target node, i.e.
{(v, t)|v 6= t}. We restricted our experiments to such can-
didate flips since initial experiments showed that they can
do significantly more damage compared to candidate flips
in other parts of the graph. This intuitively makes sense
since the further away we are from node t we can exert less
influence on it. Zu¨gner et al. (2018) show similar results
(e.g. see their indirect attack). Note that for the general (non-
targeted) attack all edges/non-edges are viable candidates.
To obtain the loss, we first pre-train a classifier on the clean
embedding Z¯∗. Then we predict the class probabilities pt
of the target t using the compromised Z¯∗t,· estimated for
a given candidate flip and we calculate the classification
margin m(t) = pt,c(t) −maxc 6=c(t) pt,c, where c(t) is the
ground-truth class for t. That is, our loss is the difference
between the probability of the ground truth and the next
most probable class after the attack. Finally, we select the
top f flips with smallest margin m (note when m(t) < 0
node t is misclassified). In practice, we average over ten
randomly trained logistic regression classifiers. In future
work we plan to treat this as a tri-level optimization problem.
Targeting link prediction. The goal of this targeted attack
is given a set of target node pairs T ⊂ V × V to decrease
the similarity between the nodes that have an edge, and
increase the similarity between nodes that do not have an
edge by modifying other parts of the graph (i.e. we disallow
to directly flip pairs in T ). For example, in an e-commerce
graph representing users and items the goal might be to
increase the similarity between a certain item and user by
adding/removing connections between other users/items. To
achieve this goal, we first train an initial clean embedding
on the graph excluding the edges in T . Then, for a candidate
flip we estimate the embedding Z¯∗ (Eqs. 2 and 3) and use
it to calculate the average precision score (AP score) on
the target set T , with Z¯∗i (Z¯∗j )T measuring the similarity of
nodes i and j (i.e. the likelihood of the link (i, j)). Low AP
score then indicates that the edges in T are less likely (non-
edges more likely resp.). Finally, we pick the top f flips
with lowest AP scores and use them to poison the network.
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(a) Cora: DeepWalk’s loss (b) Cora: Classification (c) PolBlogs: Classification
Figure 1: Vulnerability of the embeddings under the general attack for increasing number of flips. Positive (resp. negative)
numbers on the x-axis indicate adding (resp. removing) edges. The percentage of flips is w.r.t. the total number of edges in
the clean graph. The dotted line shows the performance on the clean graph before attacking.
4. Experimental Evaluation
Since this is the first work considering adversarial attacks on
node embeddings there are no known baselines. Similar to
methods that optimize the graph structure (Chen et al., 2016;
Khalil et al., 2014) we compare with several strong baselines.
Brnd randomly flips edges (we report averages over ten
seeds), Beig removes edges based on their eigencentrality in
the line graph L(A), and Bdeg removes edges based on their
degree centrality in L(A) (equivalently sum of degrees in
the graph). When adding edges we use the same baselines as
above now calculated on the complement graph except for
Beig since it is infeasible to compute even for medium size
graphs. ADW2 denotes our gradient based attack,ADW3 our
closed-form attack,Alink our targeted link prediction attack,
and Aclass is our targeted node classification attack.
The size of the sampled candidate set for adding edges under
the general attack is 20K (we report averages over five trials).
To evaluate the targeted link prediction attack we form the
target pairs T by randomly sampling 10% of the edges from
the clean graph and three times as many non-edges. This
setup reflects the fact that in practice the attackers often care
more about increasing the likelihood of a new edge, e.g.
increasing the chance of recommending an item to a user.
We aim to answer the following questions: (Q1) how good
are our approximations of the loss; (Q2) how much damage
is caused to the overall embedding quality by our attacks
compared to the baselines; (Q3) can we still perform a
successful attack when the attacker is restricted; (Q4) what
characterizes the selected (top) adversarial edges; (Q5) how
do the targeted attacks affect downstream tasks; and (Q6) are
the selected adversarial edges transferable to other models.
We set DeepWalk’s hyperparameters to: T = 5, b = 5,K =
64 and use logistic regression for classification. We analyze
three datasets: Cora (N = 2810, |E| = 15962, McCallum
et al. (2000); Bojchevski & Gu¨nnemann (2018)) and Cite-
seer (N = 2110, |E| = 7336, Giles et al. (1998)) are cita-
tion networks commonly used to benchmark embedding ap-
proaches, and PolBlogs (N = 1222, |E| = 33428, Adamic
& Glance (2005)) is a graph of political blogs. Since we are
in the poisoning setting, in all experiments after choosing
the top f flips we re-train the standard embeddings pro-
duced by DeepWalk and report the final performance. Note,
for the general attack the downstream node classification
performance is only a proxy for estimating the embedding
quality after the attack, it is not our goal to damage this task,
but rather to attack the unsupervised embeddings in general.
4.1. Approximation Quality
To estimate the approximation quality we randomly select
20K candidates from the Cora graph and we compute Pear-
son’s R score between the actual loss (including the elemen-
twise logarithm) and our approximations. For example, for
dimensionality K = 32 we have R(LDW2 ,LDW1) = 0.11
andR(LDW3 ,LDW1) = 0.90 showing that our closed-form
strategy approximates the loss significantly better than the
gradient-based one. This also holds for K = 64, 128. More-
over, we randomly select 5K candidates and we compare the
true eigenvalues λ′ after performing a flip (i.e. doing a full
eigen-decomposition) and our approximation λ˜′. We found
that the difference |λ′ − λ˜′| is negligible: several orders of
magnitude smaller than the eigenvalues themselves. The
difference between the terms |∑Tr=1 λ′ri −∑Tr=1 λ˜′ri | used
in Lemma 3 is similarly negligible. Additionally, we com-
pare the true singular values σi(S) of the matrix S and their
respective upper bounds d−1min|
∑T
r=1 λ
r
i | ≥ σi(S) obtained
from Lemma 3. The gap is different across graphs and it
is relatively small overall. We plot all these quantities for
all graphs in the appendix (Sec. 6.3). These results together
demonstrate the quality of our approximation.
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Figure 2: Cora: Classification perfor-
mance for increasingly restricted attacks.
(a) Cora (b) Citeseer
Figure 3: Targeted attack on the link prediction task.
4.2. General Attack
To better understand the attacks we investigate the effect of
removing and adding edges separately. We select the top f
edges from the respective candidate sets according to our ap-
proximation of the loss function. For adding edges, we also
implemented an alternative add-by-remove strategy denoted
as Aabr. Here, we first add cf -many edges randomly sam-
pled from the candidate set to the graph and subsequently
remove (c− 1)f -many of them (equals to only f changes
in total). This strategy performed better empirically. Since
the graph is undirected, for each (i, j) we also flip (j, i).
Fig. 1 answers question (Q2). Removed/added edges are
denoted on the x-axis with negative/positive values respec-
tively. On Fig. 1a we see that our strategies achieve a signifi-
cantly higher loss compared to the baselines when removing
edges. To analyze the change in the embedding quality
we consider the node classification task (i.e. using it as a
proxy to evaluate quality; this is not our targeted attack).
Interestingly, Bdeg is the strongest baseline w.r.t. to the loss,
but this is not true for the downstream task. As shown in
Fig. 1b and 1c, our strategies significantly outperform the
baselines. As expected, ADW3 and Aabr perform better
than ADW2 . On Cora our attack can cause up to around
5% more damage compared to the strongest baseline. On
PolBlogs, by adding only 6% edges we can decrease the
classification performance by more than 23%, while being
more robust to removing edges.
Restricted attacks. In the real world attackers cannot attack
any node, but rather only specific nodes under their control,
which translates to restricting the candidate set. To evaluate
the restricted scenario, we first initialize the candidate sets
as before, then we randomly denote a given percentage
pr of nodes as restricted and discard every candidate that
includes them. As expected, the results in Fig. 2 show that
for increasingly restrictive sets with pr = 10%, 25%, 50%,
our attack is able to do less damage. However, we always
outperform the baselines (not plotted), and even in the case
when half of the nodes are restricted (pr = 50%) we are still
able to damage the embeddings. With this we can answer
question (Q3): attacks are successful even when restricted.
Analysis of the selected adversarial edges. A natural ques-
tion to ask is what characterizes the adversarial edges that
are selected by our attack, and whether its effectiveness can
be explained by a simple heuristic such as attacking ”im-
portant” edges (e.g. edges that have high centrality). To
answer this question we analyze the top 1000 edges selected
by ADW3 on the Cora dataset. In Fig. 4a we analyze the
adversarial edges in terms of node degrees. Specifically, for
each edge we consider the degree of its source node and its
destination node and plot it on the x-axis and y-axis respec-
tively. The heatmap shows the number of adversarial edges
divided by total number of edges for each degree (binned
logarithmically). We see that low, medium and high degree
nodes are all represented and therefore we conclude that we
cannot distinguish between adversarial and non-adversarial
edges based solely on their degrees.
In Fig. 4b we plot the edge centrality distribution for the
top 1000 adversarial edges and compare it with the edge
centrality distribution of the remaining edges. We can see
that there is no clear distinction. Both of these findings
highlight the need for a principled method such as ours
since using intuitive heuristics such as degree centrality or
edge centrality cannot identify adversarial edges.
(a) Degree centrality (b) Edge centrality
Figure 4: Analysis of the adversarial edges selected by
ADW3 on the Cora graph w.r.t. different centrality measures.
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(a) Before attack (b) Baseline Brnd attack (c) Baseline Bdeg attack (d) Our Aclass attack
Figure 5: Margins for the clean and corrupted graphs for different attacks. Each dot represent one node binned logarithmically
according to its degree. The number above each (box-) plot indicates the misclassification rate (m < 0). Lower is better.
4.3. Targeted Attack
To obtain a better understanding of the performance we
study the margin m(t) (Sec. 3.4) on Cora before and after
the attack considering every node t as a potential target. We
allow a budget of only (dt+3) flips per each node (where dt
is the degree of the target node t) ensuring that the degrees
do not change noticeably after the attack. Each dot in Fig.
5 represents one node grouped by its degree in the clean
graph (logarithmic bins). We see that low-degree nodes are
easier to misclassify (m(t) < 0), and that high degree nodes
are more robust in general – the baselines have 0% success.
Our method, however, can successfully attack even high
degree nodes. In general, our attack is significantly more
effective across all bins – as shown by the numbers on top
of each box – with 77.89% nodes successfully misclassified
on average compared to e.g. only 33.64% for Brnd .
For the link prediction task (Fig. 3) we are similarly able to
cause significant damage – e.g. Alink achieves almost 10%
decrease in performance by flipping around 12.5% of edges
on Cora, significantly better than all other baselines. Here
again, compared to adding edges, removing has a stronger
effect. Overall, answering (Q5), both experiments confirm
that our attacks hinder the various downstream tasks.
4.4. Transferability
The question of whether attacks learned for one model gen-
eralize to other models is important since in practice the
attacker might not know the model used by the defender.
However, if transferability holds, such knowledge is not re-
quired. To obtain the perturbed graph, we remove the top f
adversarial edges withADW3 . The same perturbed graph is
used to learn embeddings using several other state-of-the-art
approaches: DeepWalk (DW) with both the SVD and the
SGNS loss, node2vec (Grover & Leskovec, 2016), Spectral
Embedding (von Luxburg, 2007), Label Propagation (Zhu
& Ghahramani, 2002), and GCN (Kipf & Welling, 2017).
Table 1 shows the change in node classification performance
compared to the embeddings learned on the clean graph for
each method respectively. Answering (Q6), the results show
that our attack generalizes: the adversarial edges have a no-
ticeable impact on other models as well. We see that we can
damage DeepWalk trained with the skip-gram objective with
negative sampling (SGNS) showing that our factorization
analysis via SVD is successful. We can even damage the
performance of semi-supervised approaches such as Graph
Convolutional Networks (GCN) and Label Propagation.
Table 1: Transferability: The change in F1 score (in percent)
compared to the clean/original graph. Lower is better.
Method DWSVD
DW
SGNS
node-
2vec
Spect.
Embd
Label
Prop. GCN
Cora
O
ur
A
pp
ro
ac
h f = 250(03.1%) -3.59 -3.97 -2.04 -2.11 -5.78 -3.34
f = 500(06.3%) -5.22 -4.71 -3.48 -4.57 -8.95 -2.33
Citeseer
f = 250(06.8%) -7.59 -5.73 -6.45 -3.58 -4.99 -2.21
f = 500(13.6%) -9.68 -11.47 -10.24 -4.57 -6.27 -8.61
Cora
B e
ig
B
as
el
in
e f = 250(03.1%) -0.61 -0.65 -0.57 -0.86 -1.23 -6.33
f = 500(06.3%) -0.71 -1.22 -0.64 -0.51 -2.69 -0.64
Citeseer
f = 250(06.8%) -0.40 -1.16 -0.26 +0.11 -1.08 -0.70
f = 500(13.6%) -2.15 -2.33 -1.01 +0.38 -3.15 -1.40
Compared to the transferability of the strongest baseline
Beig , shown in the lower section of Table 1, we can clearly
see that our attack causes significantly more damage.
5. Conclusion
We demonstrated that node embeddings are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks which can be efficiently computed and
have a significant negative effect on downstream tasks such
as node classification and link prediction. Furthermore,
successfully poisoning the graph is possible with relatively
small perturbations and under restriction. More importantly,
our attacks generalize - the adversarial edges are transfer-
able across different models. Developing effective defenses
against adversarial attacks as well as more comprehensive
modelling of the attacker’s knowledge are important direc-
tions for improving network representation learning.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Proofs and Derivations
Proof. Theorem 1. Applying eigenvalue perturbation the-
ory we obtain that λ′p = λp + u
T
p (∆Mˆ)up where λ
′
p is
the eigenvalue of Mˆ ′ based on A′ obtained after perturbing
the graph. Using the fact that λp = uTp Mˆup, and the fact
that singular values are equal to the absolute value of the
corresponding eigenvalues we obtain the desired result.
Proof. Theorem 2. Denote with ei the vector of all ze-
ros and a single one at position i. Then, we have ∆A =
∆wij(eie
T
j + eje
T
i ) and ∆D = ∆wij(eie
T
i + eje
T
j ). From
eigenvalue perturbation theory (Stewart, 1990), we get:
λ′y ≈ λy + uTy (∆A − λy∆D)uy. Substituting ∆A/∆D
concludes the proof.
We include an immediate result to prove Theorem 3.
Lemma 4. Consider the generalized eigenvalue problem
Au = λDu and suppose that we have the changes in the
respective matrices/vectors: ∆A,∆D and ∆λ, then the
change in the eigenvectors ∆u can be expressed as:
∆u = −(A− λD)+
(
∆A−∆λD − λ∆D
)
u
Proof. Theorem 3. Let ∆A and ∆D be defined as in The-
orem 2 and let ∆λ be the change in the eigenvalues as
computed in Theorem 2. Plugging these terms in Lemma 4
and simplifying we obtain the result.
We include an intermediate result to prove Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 5. λ is an eigenvalue ofD−1/2AD−1/2 := Anorm
with eigenvector uˆ = D1/2u if and only if λ and u solve the
generalized eigen-problem Au = λDu.
Proof. Lemma 5. We have Az = λDz =⇒
(Q−1AQ−T )(QT z) = λ(QT z) for any real symmetric A
and any positive definite D, where D = QQT using the
Cholesky factorization. Substituting the adjacency/degree
matrix and usingQ = QT = D1/2 we obtain the result.
Proof. Lemma 2. S is equal to a product of three matrices
S = D−1/2
(
Uˆ
(∑T
r=1 Λˆ
r
)
UˆT
)
D−1/2 where Uˆ ΛˆUˆT =
D−1/2AD−1/2 =: Anorm is the eigenvalue decomposition
of Anorm (Qiu et al. (2018)). From Lemma 5 we have the
fact that λ is an eigenvalue of D−1/2AD−1/2 with eigen-
vector uˆ = D1/2u if and only if λ and u solve the general-
ized eigen-problem Au = λDu. Substituting Λˆ = Λ and
Uˆ = D1/2U in S, and use the fact that D is diagonal.
Proof. Lemma 3. Following (Qiu et al., 2018), the
singular values of S can be bounded by σp(S) ≤
1
dmin
∣∣∑T
r=1(µˆpi(p))
r
∣∣ where µ are the (standard) eigenval-
ues of Anorm. Using Lemma 5, the same bound applies
using the generalized eigenvalues λp of A. Now using The-
orem 2, we obtain λ˜′p an approximation of the p-th gener-
alized eigenvalue of A′. Plugging it into the singular value
bound we obtain: σp(S) ≤ 1dmin
∣∣∑T
r=1(λ˜
′
pi(p))
r
∣∣ which
concludes the proof.
Please note that the permutation pi does not need be com-
puted/determined explicitly. In practice, for every λ˜′p, we
compute the term
∣∣∑T
r=1(λ˜
′
p)
r
∣∣. Afterwards, these terms
are simply sorted.
6.2. Analysis of Spectral Embedding Methods
Attacking spectral embedding. Finding the spectral em-
bedding is equivalent to the following trace minimization
problem:
min
Z∈R|V |×K
Tr(ZTLxyZ) =
K∑
i=1
λi(Lxy) = LSC (4)
subject to orthogonality constraints, where Lxy is the
graph Laplacian. The solution is obtained via the eigen-
decomposition of L, with Z∗ = UK where UK are the K-
first eigen-vectors corresponding to the K-smallest eigen-
values λi. The Laplacian is typically defined in three dif-
ferent ways: the unnormalized Laplacian L = D − A,
the normalized random walk Laplacian Lrw = D−1L =
I−D−1A and the normalized symmetric LaplacianLsym =
D−1/2LD−1/2 = I−D−1/2AD−1/2 = I−Anorm, where
A,D,Anorm are defined as before.
Lemma 6 ((von Luxburg, 2007)). λ is an eigenvalue of
Lrw with eigenvector u if and only if λ is an eigenvalue of
Lsym with eigenvector w = D1/2u. Furthermore, λ is an
eigenvalue of Lrw with eigenvector u if and only if λ and u
solve the generalized eigen-problem Lu = λDu.
From Lemma 6 we see that we can attack both normalized
versions of the graph Laplacian with a single attack strategy
since they have the same eigenvalues. It also helps us to do
that efficiently similar to our previous analysis (Theorem. 3).
Theorem 4. Let Lrw (or equivalently Lsym) be the initial
graph Laplacian before performing a flip and λy and uy be
any eigenvalue and eigenvector of Lrw. The eigenvalue λ′y
of L′rw obtained after flipping a single edge (i, j) is
λ′y ≈ λy + ∆wij((uyi − uyj)2 − λy(u2yi + u2yj)) (5)
where uyi is the i-th entry of the vector uy .
Proof. From Lemma 6 we can estimate the change in
Lrw (or equivalently Lsym) by estimating the eigenvalues
solving the generalized eigen-problem Lu = λDu. Let
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(a) Eigenvalues: |λ′ − λ˜′| (b) Sums of powers of eigenvalues: ∣∣∑Tr=1 λ′ri −∑Tr=1 λ˜′ri ∣∣.
Figure 6: Comparison between the true eigenvalues λ′ after performing a flip (i.e. doing a full eigen-decomposition) and
our approximation λ˜′. Since the difference is several orders of magnitude smaller than the eigenvalues (sums of powers of
eigenvalues resp.) themselves, we show a ”zoomed-in” view (note the difference in the scale on the y-axis). In each subplot
on the right side we show the average absolute difference and the standard deviation across the 5K randomly selected flips.
(a) PolBlogs (b) Cora (c) Citeseer
Figure 7: The singular value of S and our upper bound d−1min|
∑T
r=1 λ
r
i | ≥ σi(S) for different graphs.
∆L = L′ − L be the change in the unnormalized graph
Laplacian after performing a single edge flip (i, j) and ∆D
be the corresponding change in the degree matrix. Let ei be
defined as before. Then ∆L = (1−2Aij)(ei−ej)(ei−ej)T
and ∆D = (1− 2Aij)(eieTi + ejeTj ). Based on the theory
of eigenvalue perturbation we have λ′y ≈ λy + uTy (∆L −
λy∆D)uy . Finally, we substitute ∆L and ∆D.
Using now Theorem 4 and Eq. 4 we finally estimate
the loss of the spectral embedding after flipping an edge
LSC(L′rw, Z) ≈
∑K
p=1 λ
′
p. Note that here we are summing
over the K-first smallest eigenvalues. We see that spec-
tral embedding and the random walk based approaches are
indeed very similar.
Theorem 5. Let L be the initial unnormalized graph Lapla-
cian before performing a flip and λy and uy be any eigen-
value and eigenvector of L. The eigenvalue λ′y of L
′ ob-
tained after flipping a single edge (i, j) can be approximated
by:
λ′y ≈ λy − (1− 2Aij)(uyi − uyj)2 (6)
Proof. Let ∆A = A′ − A be the change in the adjacency
matrix after performing a single edge flip (i, j) and ∆D be
the corresponding change in the degree matrix. Let ei be
defined as before. Then ∆L = L′ − L = (D + ∆D) −
(A+ ∆A)− (D−A) = ∆D−∆A = (1− 2Aij)(eieTi +
eje
T
j − (eieTj + ejeTi )). Based on the theory of eigenvalue
perturbation we have λ′y ≈ λy + uTy (∆L)uy. Substituting
∆L and re-arranging we get the above results.
6.3. Approximation Quality
Approximation quality of the eigenvalues. We randomly
select 5K candidate edge flips (Cora) and we compare the
true eigenvalues λ′ after performing a flip (i.e. doing a full
eigen-decomposition) and our approximation λ˜′ obtained
from Theorem 2. We can see in Fig. 6a that the average
absolute difference |λ′−λ˜′| across the 5K randomly selected
flips and the standard deviation are negligible: several orders
of magnitude smaller than the eigenvalues themselves. The
difference between the terms |∑Tr=1 λ′ri −∑Tr=1 λ˜′ri | used
in Lemma 3 is similarly negligible as shown in Fig. 6b.
Upper bound on the singular values. Lemma 3 shows
that LDW3 is an upper bound on LDW1 (excluding the
elementwise logarithm). For a better understanding of the
tightness of the bound we visualize the true singular values
σi(S) of the matrix S and their respective upper bounds
d−1min|
∑T
r=1 λ
r
i | ≥ σi(S) obtained by applying Lemma 3
for all datasets. As we can see in Fig. 7, the gap is different
across the different graphs and it is relatively small overall.
These results together (Fig. 6 and Fig. 7) demonstrate that
we have obtained a good approximation of both the eigen-
values and the singular values, leading to a good overall
approximation of the loss.
